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Abstract
This work develops an approximation procedure for a class of non-zero-sum stochastic differ-
ential investment and reinsurance games between two insurance companies. Both proportional
reinsurance and excess-of loss reinsurance policies are considered. We develop numerical algo-
rithms to obtain the Nash equilibrium by adopting the Markov chain approximation method-
ology and applying the dynamical programming principle for the nonlinear integro-differential
Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equations. Furthermore, we establish the convergence of the ap-
proximation sequences and the approximation to the value functions. Numerical examples are
presented to illustrate the applicability of the algorithms.
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1 Introduction
Insurers tend to accumulate relatively large amounts of cash or cash equivalents through the written
insurance portfolio. Investing the surplus in a financial market in order to pay future claims and
to avoid financial ruin becomes a natural choice. In terms of financial performance the investment
income allows significant pricing flexibility in underwriting to the insurers. The surplus is allowed
to be invested in a financial market in continuous time.
On the other hand, reinsurance has been considered as an effective risk management tool for
insurance companies to transfer their risk exposure to another commercial institution. The primary
insurer pays the reinsurer a certain portion of the premiums. In return, the reinsurer is obliged
to share the risk of large claims with the primary insurer. Proportional reinsurance and excess-
of-loss reinsurance are two major types of reinsurance strategies. With proportional reinsurance,
the reinsurance company covers a fixed percentage of losses. The fraction of risk shared by the
reinsurance company is determined when the reinsurance contract is sold. The other type of
reinsurance policy is nonproportional reinsurance. The most common nonproportional reinsurance
policy is excess-of-loss reinsurance, where the primary insurance carrier (called cedent) will pay all
of the claims up to a predetermined amount (termed retention level).
The optimal risk controls for an insurance corporation has been studied extensively since the
classical collective risk model was introduced by Lundberg (1903). The insurance companies can re-
duce or eliminate the risk of loss by involving in a reinsurance program and reinvesting in the stock
market. Particularly, advanced stochastic control theory and dynamic programming principle are
widely used to design the optimal reinsurance and investment strategies of an insurance company
in previous works. Asmussen et al. (2000) used diffusion approximation to find an optimal policy
balancing the risk and expected profits for a financial corporation with excess-of-loss reinsurance.
Choulli et al. (2001) investigated the case of excess-of-loss reinsurance for an insurance company
facing a constant liability payment to maximize the expected present value of total future dividend
pay-outs. Hald and Schimidli (2004) studied the optimal proportional reinsurance policy to max-
imize the adjustment coefficient of the ruin probability with the variance premium principle; see
also Browne (1995), Chen et al. (2010), Zhang and Siu (2012), and Zhang et al. (2016).
Recently, the extension of optimal investment and reinsurance problem (Nash equilibrium) in
the context of stochastic differential games including zero-sum games and non-zero-sum games has
been developed rapidly; see the existence of the Nash equilibrium of non-zero-sum stochastic dif-
ferential game with N players over infinite time horizon in Bensoussan and Frehse (2000). The
existence of the Nash equilibrium of a non-zero-sum stochastic differential game between two insur-
ance companies in Zeng (2010). Liu and Yiu (2013) studied a zero-sum stochastic differential rein-
surance and investment game between two competing insurance companies under VaR constraints
for the purpose of risk management. Bensoussan et al. (2014) investigated a class of non-zero sum
stochastic differential game between two insurers by using the objectives of relative performance
and obtained explicit solutions for optimal reinsurance and investment strategies. Chen and Shen
(2017) formulated a stochastic Stackelberg differential reinsurance game between an insurer and a
reinsurer, allowing them to consider the benefits of both parties in the reinsurance contracts. Under
the criteria of maximizing the expected utilities of the players’ terminal surpluses, the Stackelberg
equilibrium strategies and value functions are obtained by using the backward stochastic differ-
ential equation (BSDE) approach; see also Taksar and Zeng (2011), Pun and Wong (2016), and
Yan et al. (2017).
Furthermore, people have recently realized that stochastic hybrid models have advantages to
capture discrete movements (such as random environment, market trends, interest rates, business
cycles, etc.) in the insurance market. For example, we can consider an insurance market with
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two modes to represent the dynamic insurance cycle. Market mode 1 represents a “soft” market,
where the investment return is high and the premium rate is low. While market mode 2 represents
a “hard” market, where the investment return is low and the premium rate is high. In differ-
ent markets, insurance companies adopt completely different strategies in investment and policy
sales. The insurance company is more likely to expand its business and write more policies when
market is in mode 1. The potential loss from the difference between premium income and claims
are compensated by the high investment returns. The hybrid systems enable the consideration of
the coexistence of continuous dynamics and discrete events in the systems. To reflect the hybrid
feature, one of the recent trends is to use a finite state Markov process to describe the transitions
among different regimes. The Markov-modulated switching systems are known as regime-switching
systems. The formulation of regime-switching models is a more general and versatile framework
to describe the complicated financial markets and their inherent uncertainty and randomness. Be-
cause the control strategies are affected by the asset prices on the stock market and economic
trends change quickly, Markovian regime-switching processes were introduced widely to capture
movements of random environment. In Wei et al. (2010), the optimal dividend and proportional
reinsurance strategy under utility criteria are studied for the regime-switching compound Poisson
model. Sotomayor and Cadenillas (2011) studies the optimal dividend problem in the regime-
switching model when the dividend rates are bounded, unbounded, and when there are fixed costs
and taxes corresponding to the dividend payments. Zhu (2014) studied the dividend optimization
for a regime-switching diffusion model with restricted dividend rates. A comprehensive study of
switching diffusions with “state-dependent” switching is in Yin and Zhu (2010). Bensoussan et al.
(2014) provided closed-form Nash equilibrium for a mixed regime-switching Crame´r-Lundberg dif-
fusion approximation process; see also related works Bensoussan et al. (2012) and Bensoussan et al.
(2017) for regime-switching models for real options and real options with competition. Jin et al.
(2013) designed numerical methods for a zero-sum stochastic differential reinsurance game with
regime-switching.
In this work, we are concerned with an insurance market including two insurance companies.
The two competing insurance companies adopt optimal investment and reinsurance strategies to
manage the insurance portfolios. The surplus process of each insurance company is subject to the
randomness of the market. Following the work of Bensoussan et al. (2014), the randomness of the
market is modelled by a continuous-time finite-state Markov chain and an independent market-index
process. Nevertheless, we model the surplus process as a regime-switching jump-diffusion process,
in lieu of a mixed regime-switching Crame´r-Lundberg diffusion approximation process. This allows
us to work with both proportional and excess-of-loss reinsurance policies. Equilibrium strategies
are studied by solving a system of HJI (Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs) equations for the value functions
of various players, derived from the principle of dynamic programming. Owing to the inclusion
of the random switching environment and jump processes, the system of HJI equations becomes
more complicated and closed-form solutions are virtually impossible to obtain. Thus, we adopt the
Markov chain approximation method (MCAM) developed in Kushner and Dupuis (2001) to deal
with a system of HJI (HJI) equations arising from the associated game problems. The convergence
of the approximation sequence to the jump process and the convergence of the value function will
be established. In the actual computation, we will use our approximation schemes for constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA) insurers.
As far as the significance of the contributions is concerned, this paper reveals clearly the
advantage in the following aspects. First, the problem of finding the optimal investment and
reinsurance strategy between two insurance companies under different insurance market mod-
els involves a stochastic hybrid system. Closed-form solutions can only be obtained in special
cases in Bensoussan et al. (2014) in a diffusion approximation model. Comparing with work in
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Bensoussan et al. (2014), a more versatile jump-diffusion regime-switching non-zero-sum game
model is formulated. Jin et al. (2013) only studies a zero-sum reinsurance game, where the state
process is degenerated to one dimension. While in the non-zero-sum game of the current work, a
high-dimension system of HJI equations is obtained, which adds much difficulty to construct the
approximating Markov chain. Second, the aforementioned literature mainly considers proportional
reinsurance strategies in the reinsurance games. Pun and Wong (2016) derives the Nash equilib-
rium of the robust non-zero-sum stochastic differential reinsurance game where the reinsurance
strategies are proportional. Due to the unboundedness of the excess-of-loss strategies, it is very
hard to develop the Nash equilibrium strategies for an reinsurance game. In addition to the in-
vestment, finding the explicit optimal game strategies are virtually impossible. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper to study the non-zero-sum investment and reinsurance games
in a jump-diffusion regime-switching with nonproportional reinsurance strategies. Third, the rein-
surance premium principle, which is a generalized nonlinear functional in our model, adds further
difficulties to design the game strategies. Meng et al. (2013) and Meng et al. (2015) investigate the
nonlinear premium principles in a simplified reinsurance game formulation. Our models considers
the investment and reinsurance game in more complex formulation and presents the impact of the
nonlinearity of the premium principle on investment and reinsurance strategies. Hence, the con-
structed numerical algorithm shows its advantage in finding the game strategies under our complex
stochastic hybrid system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A generalized formulation for surplus processes and
the associated control problem are presented in Section 2. We design the numerical algorithm based
on MCAM in Section 3. A directly constructed approximating Markov chain is constructed and is
proved to be locally consistent with the original processes. Section 4 deals with the convergence of
the approximated process and the value functions. Numerical examples are reported in Section 5 to
illustrate the performance of the method. Section 6 concludes the paper with a few more remarks.
2 Formulation
Let (Ω,F ,Ft, P ) be a complete filtered probability space, where the filtration {Ft}t≥0 satisfies the
usual condition and Ft = F
α
t ∨ F
W
t . We work with a finite horizon [0, T ], where T < ∞ is a
positive real number. The processes {α(t)}t≥0 and {W (t)}t≥0 = {WZ(t),WS(t)}t≥0 are defined
below. We use K as a generic constant throughout the paper, whose value may change for different
appearances.
2.1 Insurance Models
We are considering an insurance market including two competing insurance companies. Each of
the two insurance companies adopts optimal investment and reinsurance strategies to manage the
insurance portfolios. The surplus process of each insurance company is subject to the random
fluctuation of the market. Following the work of Bensoussan et al. (2014), the randomness of the
market is modelled by a continuous-time finite-state Markov chain and an independent market-
index process.
To delineate the random economy environment and other random economic factors, we use a
continuous-time Markov chain α(t) taking values in a finite space M = {1, . . . ,m}. The states of
economy are represented by the Markov chain α(t). Let the continuous-time Markov chain α(t) be
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generated by Q = (qij) ∈ R
m×m. That is,
P{α(t + δ) = j|α(t) = i, α(s), s ≤ t} =
{
qijδ + o(δ), if j 6= i,
1 + qiiδ + o(δ), if j = i,
(2.1)
where qij ≥ 0 for i, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m with j 6= i and
∑
j∈M qij = 0 for each i ∈ M.
Furthermore, we are considering the insurance portfolios in a financial market with a market
index Z(t), whose prices satisfies
dZ(t) = µZ(t, Z(t))dt + σZ(t, Z(t))dWZ(t), (2.2)
where WZ(t) is a standard Brownian motion. Denote by {F
WZ
t } the filtration generated by Brow-
nian motion {WZ(t)}t≥0. We note that Z(t) captures the dynamics of the financial market. The
cash flows of the insurance companies such as the premiums of insurance policies, claims, and
expenses, are subject to the performance of financial market. Hence, the key parameters of the
surplus process are defined as functionals of both the finite-state Markov chain α(t) and market
index Z(t).
Following the classical Crame´r-Lundberg process, we assume that X̂k(t), k ∈ {1, 2}, the surplus
of insurance company k without investment and reinsurance satisfies
dX̂k(t) = ck(α(t), Z(t))dt − Yk(t), t ≥ 0, (2.3)
where X̂k(0) := xˆk is the initial surplus, ck(α(t), Z(t)) is the rate of premium, and Yk(t) =
Nk(t)∑
i=1
Aki
is a compound Poisson process with the claim size Aki with {A
k
i : i > 1} being a sequence of positive,
independent and identically distributed random variables.
In this paper, we consider a Poisson measure in lieu of the traditionally used Poisson process.
Suppose Θ ⊂ R+ is a compact set and the function qk(·) is the magnitude of the claim sizes.
Nk(t,H) = number of claims on [0, t] with claim size taking values in H ∈ Θ, (2.4)
counts the number of claims up to time t, which is a Poisson counting process. For k = 1, 2,
Yk(t) is jump processes representing claims for each company with arrival rate λk. Note that claim
frequencies depends on the economy and financial market states. The function qk(α(t), Z(t), ρk) is
assumed to be the magnitude of the claim sizes, where ρk has distribution Πk(·), and qk(i, ·, ρk) is
continuous for each ρk and each i ∈ M. At different regimes and financial market states, taking
into consideration of random environment, the values of qk(i, ·, ρk) could be much different. Then
the Poisson measure Nk(·, ·) has intensity λkdt×Πk(dρk) where Πk(dρk) = f(ρk)dρk.
Let νk,n denote the time of the n-th claim and ζk,n = νk,n+1−νk,n. Let {ζk,v, ρk, v ≥ n} be inde-
pendent of {Xk(s), α(s), s ≤ νk,n, ζk,v, ρk, v ≤ n}. Then the n-th claim term is qk(α(νk,n), Z(νk,n), ρk),
and the claim amount of Yk can be written as Yk(t) =
∑
νk,n≤t
qk(α(νk,n), (νk,n), ρk).
2.2 Reinsurance and Investment
Let ak(t) be the Ft-progressively measurable process valued in [0, 1], an exogenous retention level,
which is a control chosen by the insurance company representing the reinsurance policy and g(ak)
is the reinsurance premium rate. Denote by Ak := {ak(t) : 0 ≤ ak(t) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ T}, the set of
reinsurance strategies of insurer k. Recall that Aki is the size of the ith claim. Let A
k
i (ak) be the
fraction of each claim paid by the primary insurance company. Then the aggregation claim amount
paid by the primary insurance company is denoted as Y akk (t).
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Remark 2.1. Note that both the claim frequencies and severities are depending on the Markov
regimes and market index. It is a more general formulation compared with the work in Bensoussan et al.
(2014), where only the claim frequencies depends on the Markov regimes and market index.
Therefore, the diffusion approximation in Bensoussan et al. (2014) is simplified due to the state-
independence of claim severity. Further, with the compound Poisson jumps, the surplus process
forms a controlled jump-diffusion regime-switching process. We aim to find optimal reinsurance
strategies under the jump-diffusion regime-switching process formulation numerically.
The insurance companies invest in both risk-free assets S0(t) and risky assets S(t) with prices
satisfying 
dS0(t)
S0(t)
= r(α(t))dt,
dS(t)
S(t)
= µS(α(t), Z(t))dt + σS(α(t), Z(t))dWS(t),
(2.5)
where r(α(t)) and µ(α(t), Z(t)) are the return rates of the risk-free and risky assets, respectively;
σS(α(t), Z(t)) is the corresponding volatility; WS(t) is a standard Brownian motion independent
of WZ(t). For k = 1, 2, the investment behavior of the insurer k is modelled as a portfolio process
bk(t), where bk(t) is invested in the risky asset S(t). Let Bk = {bk(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} denote the set of
investment strategies of insurer k.
Combining the reinsurance and investment strategies, the surplus process of the insurance
company k, denoted by X˜k(t), follows
dX˜k(t) =
{
r(α(t))X˜k(t) + bk(t)[µS(α(t), Z(t)) − r(α(t))] + ck(α(t), Z(t)) − g(ak(t))
}
dt
+bk(t)σS(α(t), Z(t))dWS(t)− dY
ak
k (t),
X˜k(0) = x˜k,
(2.6)
where Y akk (t) =
∫ t
0
∫
R+
q˜k(qk, ak)Nk(dt, dρk) and q˜k(qk, ak) is the magnitude of the claim sizes with
respect to the surplus process.
In this work, we model the competition of two insurance companies with investment and rein-
surance schemes in finite time horizon using a game theoretic formulation. The performance of
each company is measured by the relative performance of their surpluses against their competi-
tor’s. Thus, the competition between the two companies formulates a game with two players, each
of which can adjust its reinsurance strategies based on the competitor’s scheme. Let the rela-
tive surplus performance for insurance company k be Xk(t) := X˜k(t) − κkX˜l(t). Hence, Xk(t) is
governed by the following dynamic system
dXk(t)
=
∑
i∈M
I{α(t)=i}
{
r(i)Xk(t) + (bk(t)− κkbl(t))[µS(i, Z(t))− r(i)] + ck(i, Z(t)) − κkcl(i, Z(t))
−(g(ak(t))− κkg(al(t)))dt + (bk(t)− κkbl(t))σS(i, Z(t))dWS(t)
}
− dY akk (t) + κkdY
al
l (t),
(2.7)
where
Y akk (t) =
∫ t
0
∫
R+
q˜k(qk, ak)Nk(dt, dρk).
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2.3 Proportional Reinsurance
We allow the insurance companies to continuously reinsure a fraction of its claim with the retention
level ak ∈ [0, 1], k = 1, 2. Note that ak is the exogenous retention level, and the control chosen
by the insurance company for the reinsurance policy. Then q˜(qk, ak) = ak(t)qk(α(t), Z(t), ρk). We
have
Y akk (t) =
Nk(t)∑
i=1
Aki (ak) =
Nk(t)∑
i=1
akA
k
i .
Considering the proportional reinsurance strategies, for k = 1, 2. The relative surplus process
of the insurance company k, under the reinsurance and investment, follows
dXk(t) =
{
r(α(t))Xk(t) + (bk(t)− κkbl(t))[µS(α(t), Z(t)) − r(α(t))] + ck(α(t), Z(t))
−κkcl(α(t), Z(t)) − [g(ak(t))− κkg(al(t))]
}
dt+ (bk(t)− κkbl(t))σS(α(t), Z(t))dWS (t)
−ak(t)
∫
R+
qk(α(t), Z(t), ρk)Nt(dt, dρk) + κkal(t)
∫
R+
ql(α(t), Z(t), ρl)Nl(dt, dρl)
Xk(0) = x˜k − κkx˜l.
(2.8)
2.4 Excess-of-loss Reinsurance
We allow the insurance companies to continuously reinsure its claim and pay all of the claims up
to a pre-given level of amount (termed retention level). We still let ak, k = 1, 2 be the retention
level chosen by the insurance company to determine the reinsurance policy. We have that
Y akk (t) =
Nk(t)∑
i=1
Aki (ak) =
Nk(t)∑
i=1
(Aki ∧ ak).
Then q˜k(qk, ak) = qk(α(t), Z(t), ρk) ∧ ak(t).
Considering the excess-of-loss reinsurance strategies, for k = 1, 2, the relative surplus process
of the insurance company k, under the reinsurance control and investment, follows
dXk(t) =
{
r(α(t))Xk(t) + (bk(t)− κkbl(t))[µS(α(t), Z(t)) − r(α(t))] + ck(α(t), Z(t))
−κkcl(α(t), Z(t)) − [g(ak(t))− κkg(al(t))]
}
dt+ (bk(t)− κkbl(t))σS(α(t), Z(t))dWS(t)
−
∫
R+
(qk(α(t), Z(t), ρk) ∧ ak)Nk(dt, dρk) + κk
∫
R+
(ql(α(t), Z(t), ρl) ∧ al)Nl(dt, dρl)
Xk(0) = x˜k − κkx˜l.
(2.9)
2.5 Control Problem
For k = 1, 2, insurer k has a utility function Uk : R → R, where Uk is assumed to be increasing,
strictly concave, and satisfies Inada conditions, i.e.,
∂xUk(−∞) = +∞, ∂xUk(+∞) = 0.
Following the work Espinosa and Touzi (2015), the insurer k aims to maximize the expected utility
of his relative performance at the terminal time T by adopting a pair of investment and reinsurance
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strategy uk = (ak, bk) ∈ Ak ×Bk, denote Uk , Ak ×Bk. For an arbitrary pair of admissible control
u = (u1, u2) ∈ U , U1 × U2, the objective function is
Jk(t, xk, z, i, u) = E
[
Uk
(
(1− κk)X˜k(T ) + κk(X˜k(T )− X˜l(T ))
)]
= E
[
Uk
(
X˜k(T )− κkX˜l(T )
)]
,
(2.10)
for k 6= l ∈ {1, 2}. For k = 1, 2, κk measures the sensitivity of insurer k to the performance of his
competitor.
The control uk = (ak, bk) with k ∈ {1, 2} is said to be admissible if ak and bk satisfy
(i) ak(t), bk(t) are nonnegative for any t ≥ 0,
(ii) Both ak, bk are adapted to Ft.
(iii) Jk(t, xk, z, i, u) <∞ for any admissible pair uk = (ak, bk).
For k = 1, 2, letB(Uk×[0,∞)) be the σ− algebra of Borel subsets of Uk×[0,∞). We use a relaxed
control formulation; see Kushner and Dupuis (2001) for a definition and more discussions. Recall
that an admissible relaxed control mk(·) is a measure on B(Uk×[0,∞)) such thatmk(Uk×[0, t)) = t
for each t ≥ 0. With the given probability space, we say that mk(·) is an admissible relaxed
(stochastic) control for F , if mk(·, ω) is a deterministic relaxed control with probability one and if
mk(A× [0, t]) is Ft-adapted for all A ∈ B(Uk).
Given a relaxed control mk(·) of uk(·), we define the derivative mt,k(·) such that
mk(K) =
∫
Uk×[0,∞)
I{(uk ,t)∈K}mt,k(dφk)dt
for allK ∈ B(Uk×[0,∞)), and that for each t,mt,k(·) is a measure onB(Uk) satisfyingmt,k(Uk) = 1.
For example, we can define mt,k(·) in any convenient way for t = 0 and as the left-hand derivative
for t > 0,
mt,k(A) = lim
̺→0
mk(A× [t− ̺, t])
̺
, ∀A ∈ B(Uk).
Note that mk(dφkdt) = mt,k(dφk)dt. It is natural to define the relaxed control representation mk(·)
of uk(·) by mt,k(A) = I{uk(t)∈A} ∀A ∈ B(Uk). Define the relaxed control m(·) = (m1(·) ×m2(·))
with derivative mt(·) = mt,1(·)×mt,2(·). Thus m(·) is a measure on the Borel sets of U × [0,∞).
2.6 Nash Equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium u∗ = (u∗1, u
∗
2) ∈ U is achieved such that
E[U1(X˜
u1
1 (T )− κ1X˜
u∗
2
2 (T ))] ≤ E[U1(X˜
u∗
1
1 (T )− κ1X˜
u∗
2
2 (T ))],
E[U2(X˜
u2
2 (T )− κ2X˜
u∗1
1 (T ))] ≤ E[U2(X˜
u∗2
2 (T )− κ1X˜
u∗1
1 (T ))].
(2.11)
For α(t) = i ∈ M, Z(t) = z, and Xk(t) = xk, where 0 ≤ t ≤ T and k 6= l ∈ {1, 2}, the value
function of insurance company k follows
V k(t, xk, z, i) = sup
uk∈Hk
E[Uk(X˜
uk
k (T )− κkX˜
u∗l
l (T ))], (2.12)
where V k(·, ·, ·, ·) is the value function in R+ × R× R×M.
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To obtain the system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations, we assume the existence
of optimal control. For an arbitrary uk ∈ Uk, α(t) = i ∈ M, k 6= l ∈ {1, 2}, and V
k(·, ·, ·, i) ∈
C2(R+ × R× R×M), define an integro-differential operator L
uk,ul by
Luk,ulV k(t, xk, z, i) = V
k
xk
(t, xk, z, i)
{
r(i)xk + (bk − κkbl)[µ(i, z) − r(i)] + ck(i, z) − κkcl(i, z)
−(g(ak)− κkg(al))
}
+ V kz (t, xk, z, i)m(t, z)
+
1
2
(bk − κkbl)
2σ2S(i, z)Vxkxk(t, xk, z, i) +
1
2
σ2Z(t, z)Vzz(t, xk, z, i)
−λk
∫
R+
[V k(t, xk − q˜(i, z, ρk), z, i) − V
k(t, xk, z, i)]f(ρk)dρk
+λl
∫
R+
[V k(t, xk + κk q˜(i, z, ρl), z, i) − V
k(t, xk, z, i)]f(ρl)dρl
+QV (t, xk, z, ·)(i),
(2.13)
where
QV (t, xk, z, ·)(i) =
∑
j 6=i
qij(V (t, xk, z, j) − V (t, xk, z, i)).
Formally, for k 6= l ∈ {1, 2}, we conclude that V k satisfies the following system of integro-differential
HJI (Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs) equations: for each i ∈ M, V
k
t (t, xk, z, i) + sup
uk∈Hk
Luk,u
∗
l V k(t, xk, z, i) = 0,
V k(T, xk, z, i) = Uk(xk).
(2.14)
3 Numerical Algorithm
We begin by construction a discrete-time, finite-state, controlled Markov chain to approximate the
controlled diffusion process with regime-switching in the absence of jumps with the dynamic system
dXk(t) =
∑
i∈M
I{α(t)=i}
{
r(i)Xk(t) + (bk(t)− κkbl(t))[µS(i, Z(t)) − r(i)] + ck(i, Z(t))− κkcl(i, Z(t))
−(g(ak) + κkg(al))dt+ (bk(t)− κkbl(t))σS(i, Z(t))dWS(t)
}
,
dZ(t) = µZ(t, Z(t))dt + σZ(t, Z(t))dWZ(t)
Xk(0) = x˜k − κkx˜l
Z(0) = z0.
(3.1)
Because the value function depends on both the state x and the time variable t, two stepsizes are
needed. That is, we need to discretize both the state and time. We use h > 0 as the stepsize of the
state and δ > 0 as the stepsize for the time. In fact, for any given T > 0, we use N = N(δ) = ⌊T/δ⌋.
Let ei denote the unit vector in the i-th coordinate direction and R
3
h denote the uniform h-grid
on R3; i.e. R3h = {(x1, x2, z) : (x1, x2, z) = h(k1e1 + k2e2 + k3e3); k1, k2, k3 = 0,±1,±2, . . . }. We
use Sh = R
3
h, denote x = (x1, x2, z) and y = (y1, y2, z
∗).
We can rewrite the system in the short form as the following:
dX(t) = µ(X(t), α(t), u(t))dt + σ(X(t), α(t), u(t))dW (t), (3.2)
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where
µ(X(t), α(t), u(t))
=

r(α(t))X1(t) + (b1(t)− κ1b2(t))[µS(α(t), Z(t)) − r(α(t))] + c1(α(t), Z(t)) − κ1c2(α(t), Z(t))
−(g(a1(t)) + κ1g(a2(t)))
r(α(t))X2(t) + (b2(t)− κ2b1(t))[µS(α(t), Z(t)) − r(α(t))] + c2(α(t), Z(t)) − κ2c1(α(t), Z(t))
−(g(a2(t)) + κ2g(a1(t)))
µZ(t, Z(t))

σ(X(t), α(t), u(t))
= diag
(
(b1(t)− κ1b2(t))σS(α(t), Z(t)), (b2(t)− κ2b1(t))σS(α(t), Z(t)), σZ (t, Z(t))
)
W (t) =
(
WS(t),WS(t),WZ(t)
)′
,
where A′ is the transpose of A. Let {(ξh,δn , α
h,δ
n , n <∞} be a controlled discrete-time Markov chain
on R3h ×M and denote by p
h,δ
D
(
(x, i), (y, j), nδ|φ
)
the transition probability from a state (x, i) to
another state (y, j), for φ ∈ U . We use uh,δn to denote the random variable that is the control action
for the chain at discrete time n and ph,δD is so defined that the constructed Markov chain’s evolution
well approximates the local behavior of the controlled regime-switching diffusion (2.7).
For each k = 1, 2, we construct the transition probability ph,δk,D
(
(x, i), (y, j), nδ|φ
)
which is
associated with Jk(t, x, i, φ) = E [Uk (Xk(T ))] satisfying the followings:{
Jkt (t, x, i, φ) + L
uk,ulJk(t, x, i, φ) = 0,
Jk(T, x, i, φ) = Uk(xk).
(3.3)
To figure out the form of ph,δk,D
(
(x, i), (y, j)|φ
)
, we define a finite difference approximation to (3.3)
as
Jkt (t, x, i, φ) →
Jk(t+ δ, x, i, φ) − Jk(t, x, i, φ)
δ
,
Jkxk(t, x, i, φ)→
Jk(t, x+ hek, i, φ) − J
k(t, x, i, φ)
h
if r(i)xk + (bk − κkbl)[µS(i, z) − r(i)] + ck(i, z) − κkcl(i, z) − (g(ak)− κkg(al)) > 0,
Jkxk(t, x, i, φ)→
Jk(t, x, i, φ) − Jk(t, x− hek, i, φ)
h
if r(i)xk + (bk − κkbl)[µS(i, z) − r(i)] + ck(i, z) − κkcl(i, z) − (g(ak)− κkg(al)) < 0,
Jkxkxk(t, x, i, φ)→
Jk(t, x+ hek, i, φ) − 2J
k(t, x, i, φ) + Jk(t, x− hek, i, φ)
h2
,
Jkz (t, x, i, φ) →
Jk(t, x+ he3, i, φ)− J
k(t, x, i, φ)
h
if µZ(t, z) > 0,
Jkz (t, x, i, φ) →
Jk(t, x, i, φ) − Jk(t, x− he3, i, φ)
h
if µZ(t, z) < 0,
Jkzz(t, x, i, φ) →
Jk(t, x+ he3, i, φ)− 2J
k(t, x, i, φ) + Jk(t, x− he3, i, φ)
h2
.
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To proceed, define
ph,δk,D
(
(x, i), (x ± hek, i), nδ|φ
)
= δh
{
r(i)xk + (bk − κkbl)[µS(i, z) − r(i)] + ck(i, z) − κkcl(i, z)
−(g(ak)− κkg(al))
}±
+ δ2h2 (bk − κkbl)
2σ2S(i, z),
ph,δk,D
(
(x, i), (x ± he3, i), nδ|φ
)
= δhµZ(t, z)
± + δ
2h2
σ2Z(t, z),
ph,δk,D
(
(x, i), (x, j), nδ|φ
)
= qijδ,
ph,δk,D
(
(x, i), (x, i), nδ|φ
)
= 1 + qiiδ −
δ
h |r(i)xk + (bk − κkbl)[µS(i, z) − r(i)] + ck(i, z) − κkcl(i, z)
−(g(ak)− κkg(al))| −
δ
hµZ(t, z)−
δ
h2
(bk − κkbl)
2σ2S(i, z) −
δ
h2
σ2Z(t, z),
ph,δk,D
(
·
)
= 0, otherwise,
(3.4)
where K+ = max{K, 0} and K− = min{−K, 0}. By choosing δ and h appropriately, we can
have ph,δk,D
(
(x, i), (x, i), nδ|φ
)
given in (3.4) nonnegative. Thus, ph,δ(·|φ) are well-defined transition
probability.
Next, we need to approximate the Poisson jumps for ensuring the local properties of claims for
(2.7). We can rewrite the system in the matrix form as follow
dX(t) = µ(X(t), α(t), u(t))dt + σ(X(t), α(t), u(t))dB(t) + Y˜1(t)e1 + Y˜2(t)e2, (3.5)
where Y˜k(t) is the jump process w.r.t the surplus process Xk(t), for k = 1, 2.
The relative surplus process Xk(t) is determined by two jump terms with the arriving rate λk
and λl, respectively. Denote by Rk(t) the difference of the two jumps. That is,
Rk(t) =
∫
R+
q˜k(qk, ak)Nk(dt, dρk)− κk
∫
R+
q˜l(ql, al)Nl(dt, dρl).
Since the difference of two Poisson processes is again a Poisson process, events in the new process
Rk(t) will occur according to a Poisson process with the rate λ. with λ = λk + λl; and each event,
independently, will be from the first jump process with probability λk/(λk+λl), yielding the generic
claim size
A˜k =

Ak(ak), with probability
λk
λk+λl
,
−κkA
l(al), with probability
λl
λk+λl
.
Suppose that the current state is ξh,δn = x, α
h,δ
n = i, and control is u
h,δ
n = φ. The next interpola-
tion interval is determined by (3.4) and q˜hk (qk(i, z, ρk), ak) is the nearest value of q˜k(qk(i, z, ρk), ak)
so that ξh,δn+1 ∈ Sh. Then |q˜
h
k (qk(i, z, ρk), ak)− q˜k(qk(i, z, ρk), ak)| → 0 as h→ 0, uniformly in x. To
present the claim terms, we determine the next case (ξh,δn+1, α
h,δ
n+1) by noting:
1. No claims occur in [nδ, nδ + δ) with probability 1− λδ + o(δ), we determine (ξh,δn+1, α
h,δ
n+1) by
transition probability ph,δk,D(·) as in (3.4).
2. There is a claim of the relative surplus process Xk(t) in [nδ, nδ+δ) with probability λδ+o(δ),
we determine (ξh,δn+1, α
h,δ
n+1) by
ξh,δn+1 = ξ
h,δ
n − q˜
h
k (qk(i, z, ρk), ak)ek, α
h,δ
n+1 = α
h,δ
n .
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So, we define
ph,δk
(
(x, i), (y, j)|φ
)
= (1− λδ + o(δ))ph,δk,D
(
(x, i), (y, j)|φ
)
+ (λδ + o(δ))Πk{ρ : q˜h(i, z, ρ)ek = x− y}.
(3.6)
Definition 3.1. A controlled Markov chain {(ξh,δn , α
h,δ
n ), n < ∞} with the one-step transition
probability ph,δ
(
(x, i), (y, j)|φ
)
is given by
ph,δ
(
(x, i), (y, j)|φ
)
= ph,δ1
(
(x, i), (y, j)|φ
)
I{k=1} + p
h,δ
2
(
(x, i), (y, j)|φ
)
I{k=2}, (3.7)
where k is the index of the cost function.
The piecewise constant interpolations ξh,δ(·), αh,δ(·), and uh,δ(·) are defined as
ξh,δ(t) = ξh,δn , α
h,δ(t) = αh,δn , u
h,δ(t) = uh,δn for t ∈ [nδ, nδ + δ) (3.8)
Use Eφ,h,δx,i,n ,Var
φ,h,δ
x,i,n , and P
φ,h,δ
x,i,n to denote the conditional expectation, variance, and marginal prob-
ability given {ξh,δι , αδι , u
h,δ
ι , ι ≤ n, ξ
h,δ
n = x, α
h,δ
n = i, u
h,δ
n = φ}, respectively. Define the difference
∆ξh,δn = ξ
h,δ
n+1 − ξ
h,δ
n .
With the approximation of the Markov chain constructed above, we can obtain an approximation
of the utility function as follows:
Jk,δ(nδ, x, i, uh,δ) = (1− λδ + o(δ))
∑
(y,j)
ph,δk
(
(x, i), (y, j)|uh,δ
)
Jk,δ(nδ + δ, y, j, uh,δ)
+(λkδ + o(δ))
∫
R+
Jk,δ(nδ + δ, xk − q˜
h
k (qk(i, z, ρk), a
h,δ
k ), z, i, u
h,δ)Πk(dρk)
+(λlδ + o(δ))
∫
R+
Jk,δ(nδ + δ, xk + κk q˜
h
l (ql(i, z, ρl), a
h,δ
l ), z, i, u
h,δ)Πl(dρl).
(3.9)
Moreover,
V k,h,δ(nδ, x, i) = sup
uh,δk,n
Jk,h,δ(nδ, x, i, uh,δ).
(3.10)
Definition 3.2. The sequence {(ξh,δn , α
h,δ
n )} is said to be locally consistent, if it
1. There is a transition probability ph,δD is locally consistent in the sense
E
φ,h,δ
x,i,n [∆ξ
h,δ
n ] = µh,δ(x, i, φ)δ + o(δ),
Varφ,h,δx,i,n [∆ξ
h,δ
n ] = σh,δ(x, i, φ)δ + o(δ).
(3.11)
where
µh,δ(x, i, φ) =
r(i)x1 + (b1 − κ1b2)[µS(i, z) − r(i)] + c1(i, z) − κ1c2(i, z) − g(a1) + κ1g(a2)r(i)x2 + (b2 − κ2b1)[µS(i, z) − r(i)] + c2(i, z) − κ2c1(i, z) − g(a2) + κ2g(a1)
µZ(t, z)

σh,δ(x, i, φ) = diag
(
(b1 − κ1b2)
2σ2S(i, z), (b2 − κ2b1)
2σ2S(i, z), σ
2
Z(t, z)
)
.
2. The one-step transition probability ph,δ((x, i), (y, j)|φ) for the chain can be represented in the
factored form:
ph,δ((x, i), (y, j)|φ) = (1− λδ + o(δ))ph,δD ((x, i), (y, j)|φ) + (λδ + o(δ))Π{ρ : qh(i, z, ρ) = x− y}
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4 Convergence of Numerical Approximation
4.1 Representations of Approximation Sequences
To proceed, we first show that the constructed Markov chain is locally consistent. This ensures
that our approximation is reasonable in certain sense.
Lemma 4.1. The Markov chain ξh,δn with transition probabilities ph,δ(·) defined in (3.7) is locally
consistent with the stochastic differential equation in (2.7).
Proof. Define ph,δD (·) = p
h,δ
1,D(·)I{k=1} + p
h,δ
2,D(·)I{k=2}Using (3.4) and (3.7). It is easy to see that
E
φ,h,δ
x,i,n [∆ξ
h,δ
n ] = E
φ,h,δ
x,i,n [∆ξ
h,δ
n I{k=1}] + E
φ,h,δ
x,i,n [∆ξ
h,δI{k=2}]
=
r(i)x1 + (b1 − κ1b2)[µS(i, z)− r(i)] + c1(i, z) − κ1c2(i, z) − g(a1) + κ1g(a2)r(i)x2 + (b2 − κ2b1)[µS(i, z)− r(i)] + c2(i, z) − κ2c1(i, z) − g(a2) + κ2g(a1)
µZ(t, z)
 δ.
Likewise, we obtain Eφ,h,δx,i,n
[
∆ξh,δn (∆ξ
h,δ
n )′
]
and Varφ,h,δx,i,n [∆ξ
h,δ
n ]. 
Let ξh,δ(0) = x, αh,δ(0) = i. Define the relaxed control representation mh,δk (·) of u
h,δ
k (·) by using
its derivative mh,δt,k (A) = I{uh,δ(t)∈A}. Let H
h,δ
n denote the event that ξ
h,δ
n , α
h,δ
n is determined by the
case of “no claim occurs” and use T δn to denote the event of “one claim occurs”. Let IHh,δn
and I
Th,δn
be corresponding indicator functions, respectively. Then I
Hh,δn
+ I
Th,δn
= 1 and we can write
ξh,δ(t) = ξh,δ(0) +
⌊t/δ⌋−1∑
r=0
[∆ξh,δr IHh,δr
+∆ξh,δr ITh,δr
]
= x+
⌊t/δ⌋−1∑
r=0
E
φ,h,δ
x,i,r [∆ξ
h,δ
r IHh,δr
] +
⌊t/δ⌋−1∑
r=0
(∆ξh,δr − E
φ,h,δ
x,i,r ∆ξ
h,δ
r )IHh,δr
+
⌊t/δ⌋−1∑
r=0
∆ξh,δr ITh,δr
.
(4.1)
Define Fh,δn as the smallest σ-algebra generated by {ξ
h,δ
r , α
h,δ
r ,m
h,δ
r ,H
h,δ
r , r ≤ n} and F
h,δ
t as the
smallest σ- algebra generated by {ξh,δ(s), αh,δ(s),mh,δ(s),Hh,δ(s), s ≤ t}.
For k, l = 1, 2 and k 6= l, denote
Mh,δ(t) =
⌊t/δ⌋−1∑
r=0
(∆ξh,δr − E
φ,h,δ
x,i,r ∆ξ
h,δ
r )IHh,δr
Y h,δk (t) = −
⌊t/δ⌋−1∑
r=0
[∆ξh,δr ]
′ekITh,δr
=
∫ t
0
∫
R+
q˜hk (qk(α
h,δ(s), Zh,δ(s), ρk), a
h,δ
k (s))N
h,δ
k (ds, dρk)
−
∫ t
0
∫
R+
κk q˜
h
l (ql(α
h,δ(s), Zh,δ(s), ρl), a
h,δ
l (s))N
h,δ
l (ds, dρl).
(4.2)
Then Mh,δ(t) is a martingale with respect to Fh,δ⌊t/δ⌋. Now, we represent M
h,δ(t) similar to the
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diffusion term in (2.7). Define W h,δk (·) as
W h,δ(t) =
⌊t/δ⌋−1∑
r=0
[σh,δ(x, φ, i)]−1(∆ξh,δr − E
φ,h,δ
x,i,r ∆ξ
h,δ
r )IHh,δr
=
∫ t
0
[σh,δ(ξh,δ(s), αh,δ(s), uh,δ(s))]−1dMh,δ(s).
(4.3)
The local consistency leads to
⌊t/δ⌋−1∑
r=0
E
φ,h,δ
x,i,r [∆ξ
h,δ
r IHh,δr
]
=
⌊t/δ⌋−1∑
r=0

r(αh,δr )ξδre1 + (b
h,δ
1,r − κ1b
h,δ
2,r )[µ(α
h,δ
r , ξ
h,δ
r e3)− r(α
h,δ
r )]
+c1(α
h,δ
r , ξ
h,δ
r e3)− κ1c2(α
h,δ
r , ξ
h,δ
r e3)− g(a
h,δ
1,r ) + κ1g(a
h,δ
2,r )
r(αh,δr )ξ
h,δ
r e2 + (b
h,δ
2,r − κ2b
h,δ
1,r )[µ(α
h,δ
r , ξ
h,δ
r e3)− r(α
h,δ
r )]
+c2(α
h,δ
r , ξ
h,δ
r e3)− κ2c1(α
h,δ
r , ξ
h,δ
r e3)− g(a
h,δ
2,r ) + κ2g(a
h,δ
1,r )
µZ(rδ, ξ
h,δ
r e3)
 δIHh,δr + o(δ)IHh,δr
=
∫ t
0
µh,δ(ξh,δ(s), αh,δ(s), uδ(s))ds + εh,δ(t).
For each t, E[number of r : νh,δk,r ≤ t] = λkt as h, δ → 0. This implies that we can drop IHh,δr
with
no effect on the above limit.
As a consequence, we can rewrite (4.1) as following:
ξh,δ(t) = x+
∫ t
0
∫
U
µh,δ(ξh,δ(s), αh,δ(s), φ)mh,δs (dφ)ds
+
∫ t
0
∫
U
σh,δ(ξh,δ(s), αh,δ(s), φ)mh,δs (dφ)dW
h,δ(s)
+
(∫ t
0
∫
R+
∫
U
q˜h1 (q1(α
h,δ(s), Zh,δ(s), ρ1), a1)m
h,δ
s (dφ)N
h,δ
1 (ds, dρ1)
−
∫ t
0
∫
R+
∫
U
κ1q˜
h
2 (q2(α
h,δ(s), Zh,δ(s), ρ2), a2)m
h,δ
s (dφ)N
h,δ
2 (ds, dρ2)
)
e1
+
(∫ t
0
∫
R+
∫
U
q˜h2 (q2(α
h,δ(s), Zh,δ(s), ρ2), a2)m
h,δ
s (dφ)N
h,δ
2 (ds, dρ2)
−
∫ t
0
∫
R+
∫
U
κ2q˜
h
1 (q1(α
h,δ(s), Zh,δ(s), ρ1), a1)m
h,δ
s (dφ)N
h,δ
1 (ds, dρ1)
)
e2 + ε
h,δ(t).
(4.4)
We can also rewrite (3.5) as
X(t) = x+
∫ t
0
∫
U
µ(X(s), α(s), φ(s))ms(dφ)ds +
∫ t
0
∫
U
σ(X(s), α(s), φ)ms(dφ)dW (s)
+
(∫ t
0
∫
R+
∫
U
q˜1(q1(α(s), Z(s), ρ1), a1)ms(dφ)N1(ds, dρ1)
−
∫ t
0
∫
R+
∫
U
κ1q˜2(q2(α(s), Z(s), ρ2), a2)ms(dφ)N2(ds, dρ2)
)
e1
+
(∫ t
0
∫
R+
∫
U
q˜2(q2(α(s), Z(s), ρ2), a2)ms(dφ)N2(ds, dρ2)
−
∫ t
0
∫
R+
∫
U
κ2q˜1(q1(α(s), Z(s), ρ1), a1)ms(dφ)N1(ds, dρ1)
)
e2.
(4.5)
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4.2 Convergence of Approximating Markov Chains
Lemma 4.2. Using the transition probability {ph,δ(·)} defined in (3.7), the interpolated process of
the constructed Markov chain {αh,δ(·) converges weakly to α(·), the Markov chain with generator
Q.
Proof. The proof can be obtained similar to (Yin et al., 2003, Theorem 3.1). The details are thus
omitted. 
Theorem 4.3. Let the approximating chain {ξh,δn , α
h,δ
n , n <∞} constructed with transition proba-
bilities defined in (3.7) be locally consistent with (3.11), mh,δ(·) be the relaxed control representa-
tion of {uh,δ, n <∞}, (ξh,δ(·), αh,δ(·)) be the continuous-time interpolation defined in (3.8). Then
{ξh,δ(·), αh,δ(·),mh,δ(·),W h,δ(·), Nh,δ1 (·, ·), N
h,δ
2 (·, ·)} is tight.
Proof. Note that αh,δ(·) is tight. It follows that for each ∆ > 0, each t > 0, and 0 < t˜ ≤ ∆, there
is a random variable γh,δ(∆) > 0 such that
Et|W
h,δ(t+ t˜)−W h,δ(t)|2 =
⌊t+t˜/δ⌋−1∑
⌊t/δ⌋
Et{[σ
h,δ(x, φ, i)]−1(∆ξh,δr − E
φ,h,δ
x,i,r ∆ξ
h,δ
r )IHh,δr
}2
≤ Etγ
h,δ(∆)
(4.6)
satisfying lim
∆→0
lim sup
h,δ→0
Eγh,δ(∆) = 0, which yields the tightness ofW h,δ(·). A similar argument leads
to the tightness of Mh,δ(·). The sequence mh,δ(·) is tight because of its compact range space. By
virtue of Kushner and Dupuis (2001)[Theorem 9.2.1], we obtain the tightness of {Nh,δk (·), k = 1, 2}
since the mean number of claims on any bounded interval [t, t+ t1] is bounded and
lim
∆→0
inf
r
P{νh,δk,r+1 − ν
h,δ
k,r > ∆|ν
h,δ
k,r} = 1.
This implies the tightness of {Rh,δk (·), k = 1, 2}. As a consequence, ξ
h,δ(·) is tight and
{ξh,δ(·), αh,δ(·),mh,δ(·),W h,δ(·), Nh,δ1 (·, ·), N
h,δ
2 (·, ·)} is tight.

Because {ξh,δ(·), αh,δ(·),mh,δ(·),W h,δ(·), Nh,δ1 (·, ·), N
h,δ
2 (·, ·)} is tight, the Prohorov’s theorem
implies that it is sequentially compact. Thus we can extract a weakly convergent subsequence.
Select such a convergent subsequence and still index the sequence by h, δ for notational simplicity.
We proceed to characterize the limit process.
Theorem 4.4. Let {ξ(·), α(·),m(·),W (·), N1(·, ·), N2(·, ·)} be the limit of weakly convergent subse-
quence and Ft be the σ-algebra generated by {X(s), α(s),m(s),W (s), N1(s, ·), N2(s, ·), s ≤ t}. Then
W (·) is a standard Ft-Brownian motion and N1(·, ·), N2(·, ·) are Ft-Poisson measures, and m(·) is
an admissible relaxed control.
Proof. The proof is divided into several steps.
Step 1: By the Skorohod representation, with a slight abuse of notation, {ξh,δ(·), αh,δ(·),mh,δ(·),
W h,δ(·), Nh,δ1 (·, ·), N
h,δ
2 (·, ·)} converges to {ξ(·), α(·),m(·),W (·), N1(·, ·), N2(·, ·)} w.p.1, and the con-
vergence is uniform on any compact set.
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To proceed, we first verify that W (·) is an Ft-Brownian motion. For any real-valued and
continuous function ψ, define
(ψ,m)t =
∫ t
0
∫
U
ψ(φ, s)ms(dφ). (4.7)
For any given f(·) ∈ C20(R
3) (C2 function with compact support), consider an associate operator
Lwf(w) =
1
2
3∑
i=1
∂2
∂wi∂wi
f(w). Let t, t˜ > 0 be given with t + t˜ ≤ T , along with arbitrary positive
integers κ and κ˜, arbitrary ti ≤ t and continuous functions ψj with i ≤ κ and j ≤ κ˜, any bounded
and continuous function h(·), and arbitrary f ∈ C20(R
3). Denote {Γκi , i ≤ κ} as a sequence of
nondecreasing partition of R+ such that Π(∂Γ
κ
i ) = 0 for all i, κ, where ∂Γ
κ
i is the boundary of the
set Γκi . As κ→∞, let the diameter of the sets Γ
κ
i go to zero.
By (4.3), W h,δ(·) is an Fh,δt -Brownian motion,
Eh(ξh,δ(ti), α
δ(ti),W
h,δ(ti), (ψj ,m
h,δ)ti : i ≤ κ, j ≤ κ˜)
×
(
f(W h,δ(t+ t˜)− f(W h,δ(t))−
∫ t+t˜
t
Lwf(W
h,δ(s))ds
)
= 0.
By the weak convergence and the Skorohod representation, we may assume that W h,δ(·) converges
to W (·) w.p.1, and hence as δ → 0,
Eh(ξh,δ(ti), α
δ(ti),W
h,δ(ti), (ψj ,m
h,δ)ti : i ≤ κ, j ≤ κ˜)
(
f(W h,δ(t+ t˜)− f(W h,δ(t))
)
→ Eh(ξ(ti), α(ti),W (ti), (ψj ,m)ti : i ≤ κ, j ≤ κ˜)
(
f(W (t+ t˜)− f(W (t))
)
,
Eh(ξh,δ(ti), α
h,δ(ti),W
h,δ(ti), (ψj ,m
h,δ)ti : i ≤ κ, j ≤ κ˜)
(∫ t+t˜
t
Lwf(W
h,δ(s))ds
)
→ Eh(ξ(ti), α(ti),W (ti), (ψj ,m)ti : i ≤ κ, j ≤ κ˜)
(∫ t+t˜
t
Lwf(W (s))ds
)
.
Thus,
Eh(ξ(ti), α(ti),W (ti), (ψj ,m)ti : i ≤ κ, j ≤ κ˜)
(
f(W (t+ t˜))− f(W (t))−
∫ t+t˜
t
Lwf(W (s))ds
)
= 0.
Moreover, consider the collection of random variables generated by {h(ξ(ti), α(ti),W (ti), (ψj ,m)ti :
i ≤ κ, j ≤ κ˜)}. It follows that f(W (t))− f(W (0)−
∫ t
0 Lwf(W (s))ds is a martingale. By virtue of
the Skorohod representation and the dominated convergence theorem together with (4.6), we have
Eh(ξ(ti), α(ti),W (ti), (ψj ,m)ti : i ≤ κ, j ≤ κ˜)
[
(W (t+ δ)−W (t))2 − δ
]
= 0.
Moreover, the quadratic variation of the martingaleW (t) is tI3 andW (·) is an Ft-Brownian motion,
where I3 is an 3× 3 identity matrix.
Step 2: We proceed to show that Nk(·, ·) is an Ft-Poisson measure for each k = 1, 2. Let θ(·)
be a continuous function on R+ and define the process
Θk =
∫ t
0
∫
R+
θ(ρ)Nk(ds, dρ).
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Using similar argument as in the proof of the Brownian motion above, if f(·) ∈ C20(R
3) then
Eh(ξ(ti), α(ti),W (ti), (ψj ,m)ti , N(ti,Γ
κ
i ), i ≤ κ, j ≤ κ˜)
×
[
f(Θk(t+ t˜))− f(Θk(t))− λk
∫ t+t˜
t
∫
R+
[
f(Θk(s) + θ(ρ))− f(Θk(s))
]
Π(dρ)ds
]
= 0.
This implies that Nk(·, ·) is an Ft-Possion measure for each k = 1, 2.
Step 3.1: We will use (4.1) for the rest of the proof. Note that E|εh,δ(t)| → 0 as h, δ → 0.
Letting h, δ → 0 and using the Skorohod representation for (4.1), we have∫ t
0
∫
U
µh,δ(ξh,δ(s), αh,δ(s), φ)mh,δs (dφ)ds −
∫ t
0
∫
U
µ(ξ(s), α(s), φ)mh,δs (dφ)ds → 0,
uniformly on any bounded time interval with probability one. On the other hand, the sequence
mh,δ(·) converges in the compact-weak topology, thus, for any continuous and bounded function
ψ(·) with compact support,∫ t
0
∫
U
ψ(φ, s)mh,δ(dφds)→
∫ t
0
∫
U
ψ(φ, s)m(dφds) as h, δ → 0.
By virtue of the Skorohod representation and the weak convergence, as h, δ → 0,∫ t
0
∫
U
µh,δ(ξh,δ(s), αh,δ(s), φ)mh,δs (dφ)ds −
∫ t
0
∫
U
µ(ξ(s), α(s), φ)ms(dφ)ds → 0, (4.8)
uniformly in t with probability one on any bounded interval.
Step 3.2: For any t1 ≥ t, t2 ≥ 0 with t1 + t2 ≤ T , any C1,20 function f(·) (functions that
have compact support whose first partial derivative w.r.t. the time variable and the second partial
derivatives w.r.t. the state variable x are continuous), bounded and continuous function h(·), any
positive integers κ, κ˜, ti, and any continuous function ψj satisfying t ≤ ti ≤ t1 and i ≤ κ, and j ≤ κ˜,
the weak convergence and the Skorohod representation imply that
Eh(ξh,δ(ti), α
h,δ(ti),M
h,δ(ti), (ψj ,m
h,δ)ti : i ≤ κ, j ≤ κ˜)
×[f(t1 + t2,Mh,δ(t1 + t2))− f(t1,Mh,δ(t1))]
→ Eh(ξ(ti), α(ti),M(ti), (ψj ,m)ti : i ≤ κ, j ≤ κ˜)[f(t
1 + t2,M(t1 + t2)− f(t1,M(t1))]
(4.9)
with h, δ → 0. Choose a sequence {nδ} such that nδ →∞ but ∆δ = δnδ → 0, then
Eh(ξh,δ(ti), α
h,δ(ti),M
h,δ(ti), (ψj ,m
h,δ)ti : i ≤ κ, j ≤ κ˜)
×[f(t1 + t2,Mh,δ(t1 + t2))− f(t1,Mh,δ(t1))]
= Eh(ξh,δ(ti), α
δ(ti),M
h,δ(ti), (ψj ,m
h,δ)ti : i ≤ κ, j ≤ κ˜)
×
[∑(t1+t2)/δ−1
lnδ=t1/δ
f(δ(lnδ + nδ),Mh,δ(δ(lnδ + nδ)))
−f(δlnδ,Mh,δ(δ(lnδ + nδ))) + f(δlnδ,Mh,δ(δ(lnδ + nδ)))− f(δlnδ,M δ(δlnδ))
]
.
(4.10)
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Note that
(t1+t2)/δ∑
lnδ=t1/δ
[f(δ(lnδ + nδ),M δ(δ(lnδ + nδ)))− f(δlnδ,Mh,δ(δ(lnδ + nδ)))]
=
(t1+t2)/δ∑
lnδ=t1/δ
lnδ+nδ−1∑
k=lnδ
[f(δ(k + 1),Mh,δ(δ(lnδ + nδ))) − f(δk,Mh,δ(δ(lnδ + nδ)))]
=
(t1+t2)/δ∑
lnδ=t1/δ
∂f(δlnδ,M δ(δ(lnδ + nδ)))
∂s
∆δ + o(1),
where o(1)→ 0 in mean uniformly in t as δ → 0. Letting δlnδ → s as δ → 0, then δ(lnδ + nδ)→ s
since ∆δ = δnδ → 0 as δ → 0. Then, by the weak convergence and the Skorohod representation,
the continuity of h(·), and the smoothness of f(·) imply that
Eh(ξh,δ(ti), α
h,δ(ti),M
h,δ(ti), (ψj ,m
h,δ)ti : i ≤ κ, j ≤ κ˜)
×
∑(t1+t2)/δ
lnδ
[
f(δ(lnδ + nδ),Mh,δ(δ(lnδ + nδ)))− f(δlnδ,Mh,δ(δ(lnδ + nδ)))
]
→ Eh(ξ(ti), α(ti),M(ti), (ψj ,m)ti : i ≤ κ, j ≤ κ˜)
[∫ t1+t2
t1
∂f(s,M(s))
∂s
ds
]
as h, δ → 0.
(4.11)
The last part of (4.10) can be seen as
(t1+t2)/δ∑
lnδ=t1/δ
[f(δlnδ,Mh,δ(δ(lnδ + nδ)))− f(δlnδ,Mh,δ(δlnδ))]
=
(t1+t2)/δ∑
lnδ=t1/δ
{ 3∑
i=1
1
2
fMiMi(δln
δ,Mh,δ(δlnδ))
lnδ+nδ−1∑
k=lnδ
[Mh,δi (δ(ln
δ + nδ))−Mh,δi (δln
δ)]2
}
+ε˜h,δ(t1 + t2)− ε˜h,δ(t1),
where fMiMi denotes the second partial derivatives, M
h,δ
i (·) is the i-th component of M
h,δ(·) and
sup
t≤t1≤T
E|ε˜h,δ(t1)| → 0 as h, δ → 0.
By (4.2) and the definition of σh,δ(·), we have
(t1+t2)/δ∑
lnδ=t1/δ
{ 2∑
i=1
fMiMi(δln
δ,Mh,δ(δlnδ))
lnδ+nδ−1∑
k=lnδ
[Mh,δi (δ(ln
δ + nδ))−Mh,δi (δln
δ)]2
}
→
∫ t1+t2
t1
∫
U
Tr
[
HMf(s,M(s))σ(ξ(s), α(s), φ)[σ(ξ(s), α(s), φ)]
′
]
ms(dφ)ds,
(4.12)
where HM(f(s,M(s))) is the Hessian matrix of f(·) at time s, Tr(·) represents for the trace of a
matrix.
Using (4.9)-(4.12), we have
Eh(ξ(ti), α(ti),M(ti), (ψj ,m)ti : i ≤ κ, j ≤ κ˜)
×
[
f(t1 + t2,M(t1 + t2))− f(t1,M(t1))−
∫ t1+t2
t1
∂f(s,M(s))
∂s
ds
−
∫ t1+t2
t1
∫
U
1
2
Tr
(
HMf(s,M(s))σ(ξ(s), α(s), φ)[σ(ξ(s), α(s), φ)]
′
)
ms(dφ)ds
]
= 0.
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Therefore,∫ t
0
∫
U
σh,δ(ξh,δ(s), αh,δ(s), φ)mh,δs (dφ)ds→
∫ t
0
∫
U
σ(ξ(s), α(s), φ)ms(dφ)ds, (4.13)
uniformly in t with probability one on any bounded interval.
Using the same arguments as in Step 2 and Step 3.2, we obtain the limits for the latter parts
of (4.4). As a result, ξ(·) is the solution of (4.5), which means ξ(s) = X(s) w.p.1 and m(·) is an
admissible relaxed control. 
4.3 Convergence of the Cost and the Value Functions
Note that since Uk(·) satisfies the Inada’s conditions. There exist positive real numbers K and k0
such that |Uk(Xk)| ≤ K(1 + |Xk|
k0). We proceed to prove the following result.
Theorem 4.5. Suppose that the utility functions Uk(·) has at most polynomial growth. Then the
value functions V k,h,δ(t, x, i) converges to V k(t, x, i) for k = 1, 2, respectively, as h, δ → 0.
Proof. By Theorem 4.3, each sequence {ξh,δ(·), αh,δ(·),mh,δ(·),W h,δ(·), Nh,δ1 (·, ·), N
h,δ
2 (·, ·)} has
a weakly convergent subsequence with the limit ξh,δ(·) satisfying (4.5). Using the same nota-
tion as above and applying the Skorohod representation, the weak convergence, as h, δ → 0,
Jk,h,δ(t, x, i,mh,δ)→ Jk(t, x, i,m), for k = 1, 2. The cost function is given by (3.9). Since V k(t, x, i)
is the maximizing expected utility, for any admissible control m(·), Jk(t, x, i,m) ≤ V k(t, x, i), for
k = 1, 2. Let m˜h,δ(·) be an optimal relaxed control for {ξh,δ(·)}, which implies
V k,h,δ(t, x, i) = Jk,h,δ(t, x, i, m˜h,δ) = sup
mh,δ
Jk,h,δ(t, x, i,mh,δ).
Choose a subsequence {h˜, δ˜} of {h, δ} such that
lim sup
h,δ→0
V k,h,δ(t, x, i) = lim
h˜,δ˜→0
V k,h˜,δ˜(t, x, i) = lim
h˜,δ˜→0
Jk,h˜,δ˜(t, x, i, m˜h˜,δ˜).
Without loss of generality, we may assume that {ξh˜,δ˜(·), αh˜,δ˜(·),W h˜,δ˜(·), m˜h˜,δ˜(·), N h˜,δ˜1 (·, ·), N
h˜,δ˜
2 (·, ·)}
converges weakly to {X(·), α(·),W (·),m(·), N1 (·, ·), N2(·, ·)}, where m(·) is an admissible relaxed
control. Then the weak convergence and the Skorohod representation leads to
lim sup
h,δ→0
V k,δ(t, x, i) = lim
h˜,δ˜→0
Jk,h˜,δ˜(t, x, i, m˜h˜,δ˜) = Jk(t, x, i,m) ≤ V k(t, x, i).
We claim that lim inf
δ
V k,δ(t, x, i) ≥ V k(t, x, i).
Suppose thatm(·) is an optimal control with Brownian motionW (·) such that X(·) is the associ-
ated trajectory. By the chattering lemma (see Yin et al (2009) and page 59-60 of Kushner and Dupuis
(2001)), for any given η, δη > 0, there is an ε > 0 and an ordinary control u
η,δη(·) that takes only
finite many values, uη,δη(·) is a constant in [ιε, ιε + ε), mη,δη (·) is its relaxed control representa-
tion, and Jk(t, x, i,mη,δη) ≥ V k(t, x, i) − η. For each η, δη > 0, and the corresponding ε > 0,
consider an optimal control problem with piecewise constant on [ιε, ιε + ε). We consider the pro-
cess {Xη,δη (ιε), αη,δη ,mη,δη (ιε),W η,δη (ιε)}. Let uˆη,δη (·) be the optimal control, mˆη,δη(·) the relaxed
control representation, and Xˆη,δη (·) the associated trajectory. Since mˆη,δη(·) is the optimal con-
trol, Jk(t, x, i, mˆη,δη ) ≥ Jk(t, x, i,mη,δη ) ≥ V k(t, x, i) − η. Using the chattering lemma, we can
approximate mˆη,δη(·) by a sequence of mh,δ(·). Then
V k,h,δ(t, x, i) ≥ Jk,h,δ(t, x, i,mh,δ)→ Jk(t, x, i, mˆη,δη ).
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Moreover,
lim inf
h,δ→0
V k,h,δ(t, x, i) ≥ lim
h,δ→0
Jk,h,δ(t, x, i,mh,δ) = Jk(t, x, i, mˆη,δη ).
Thus, lim inf
h,δ→0
V k,h,δ(t, x, i) ≥ V k(t, x, i)−η. The arbitrariness of η implies that lim inf
δ→0
V k,δ(t, x, i) ≥
V k(t, x, i), which completes the proof. 
5 Numerical Examples
In this section, we present some numerical results for the case in which both insurance companies are
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) agents, i.e., each agent has an exponential utility function.
More precisely, the utility function of each insurer has the form
Uk(Xk) = −
1
ηk
exp (−ηkXk), for ηk > 0, k = 1, 2. (5.1)
Based on the algorithm constructed above, we carry out the computation by valuing iterations in
a backward manner by time.
1. Set t = T − δ and Jk,h,δ(T, x, i, uh,δ) = Uk(xk), for each k = 1, 2.
2. By (3.9), we obtain
Jk,δ(t, x, i, uh,δ) = (1− λδ)
∑
(y,j)
ph,δk
(
(x, i), (y, j)|uh,δ
)
Jk,δ(t+ δ, y, j, uh,δ)
+λkδ
∫
R+
Jk,δ(t+ δ, xk − q˜
h
k(qk(i, z, ρk), a
h,δ
k ), z, i, u
h,δ)Πk(dρk)
+λlδ
∫
R+
Jk,δ(t+ δ, xk + κk q˜
h
l (ql(i, z, ρl), a
h,δ
l ), z, i, u
h,δ)Πl(dρl).
Find the pair {uˆh,δk , k = 1, 2} and record u
h,δ
k (t) = uˆ
h,δ
k satisfying that for any u
h,δ
k ∈ Uk,:
J1,h,δ(t, x, i, uh,δ1 , uˆ
h,δ
2 ) ≤ J
1,h,δ(t, x, i, uˆh,δ1 , uˆ
h,δ
2 )
J2,h,δ(t, x, i, uˆh,δ1 , u
h,δ
2 ) ≤ J
2,h,δ(t, x, i, uˆh,δ1 , uˆ
h,δ
2 ).
3. Let t = t − δ and continue the procedure until t = 0. We consider the case in which the
discrete event consists of two states, or equivalently, the Markov chain has two states with
given claim size distributions. In addition, we assume that the claim size distributions are
identical in each regime. By using the value iteration methods, we numerically solve the
optimal control problems. The continuous-time Markov chain α(t) representing the discrete
event state has the generator Q =
(
−0.5 0.5
0.5 −0.5
)
and takes values in M = {1, 2}.
The parameters of the utility function are η1 = 17.0 and η1 = 21.0 respectively. The sensitivities
are κ1 = 0.8 and κ2 = 0.7. The claim severity of both players follows exponential distribution
f (y) = θke
−θky with θ1 = 0.3 and θ2 = 0.2. To incorporate the difference between claim densities
in different regimes, we assume arriving rates of Poisson jump are different. So is the setup for
risk-free return, and premium income rate. The detail of setup is as follows in Table 1.
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Regime r c1 c2 λ1 λ2
0.02 0.05 0.02 0.20 0.30
2 0.03 0.10 0.20 0.80 0.70
Table 1: Parameters values
The reinsurance premium rates are computed from expectation premium principle as:
gk (ak) = (1 + lk) (1− ak)E [Ak] ,
where l1 = 1.1 and l2 = 1.15. Further, the volatility and the drift of the financial market index and
the risky return rate are modeled respectively by:
µS (i, Z) = 0.2iZ;
σS (i, Z) = 0.4iZ;
µZ (t, Z) = 0.4 (t+ 1)Z;
σZ (t, Z) = 0.1 (t+ 1)Z.
State discretization follows δ = 0.04 and h = 0.2. For reinsurance, we discretize the reinsurance
rate into six levels uniformly located from 0 to 1. The investment amount is free from restrictions,
and can vary from -3 to 3 with 0.2 increase. The trend of investment and reinsurance for the
varying relative surplus of player one is plotted in Figure 1, and that for the second player is in
Figure 2.
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Figure 1: Controls for varying X1 with T = 0.08, Z = 1.01, and X2 = 0.
From Figure 1, we can observe that both players always hold a low proportion of claim, which
is due to the fact that both players are very risk-averse. A big claim will not only reduce their
relative surplus but also drive the surplus of their opponent side up. Precisely, in regime one, the
proportion held by player two is 0, which is less than 0.2 of player one. This results from the claim
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arriving rate of the player two is relatively much higher than that of player one. In regime two,
considering the high premium income rate and the same expected claim amount, a small proportion
of claim is affordable for both players.
In view of the investment part of Figure 1, player two’s investment amount is always no less
than that of player one. Since the relative sensitivity of player one to player two is higher, and
player two’s relative surplus is at a higher relative level initially, player two is willing to accept
more risk for higher expected return in order to beat player one. Then, along with growing X1,
since player one’s condition is improved, he tends to bear less risk. Meanwhile, player two adopts
conservative strategy as well, since he can lower the uncertainty and make use of his advantage
that he owns a higher premium income rate. Because a higher market volatility in regime two
will introduce more risk, both players choose the investment amount much closer to 0 to lower the
uncertainty.
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Figure 2: Controls for varying X2 with T = 0.08, Z = 1.01, and X1 = 1.
Similar results can be seen from Figure 2. For the reinsurance part, player two initially holds
full proportion of a claim, since X2 = −1 leaves player two in a relative bad situation compared to
X1 = 1. To change this situation, he chooses to bear lots of risk to reduce the loss from reinsurance
premium. This is more obvious for regime 1, where the claim arriving rate is lower. Hence, in more
risky scenarios where claim arriving rate is higher, players show relative risk averse and transfer
more risks by reinsurance tools. For the investment part, we can see that player two hold higher
positions in risky assets in his portfolio in both regimes, which is consistent with the observations
in Figure 1.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we considered a non-zero-sum stochastic investment and reinsurance game between
two insurance companies. Both proportional and non-proportional reinsurance contracts were con-
sidered. Although we are able to obtain the systems of HJI equations using dynamic programming
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principle, solving the problem explicitly is virtually impossible. Thus we developed a numerical
scheme using the Markov chain approximation method (MCAM) to solve the problem. Due to the
complexity of the stochastic game formulation, even numerically solving the systems of HJI equa-
tions is much more difficult than that of the previous work in stochastic optimization problems.
The difficulties arise from the following two aspects. (1) With complex nonlinear state processes,
the formulated high-dimension problem adds much difficulties in building approximating Markov
chain. (2) The curse of dimensionality makes a significant impact and slow down the computation
due to the large numbers of control variables and the dimensions of the HJI systems. Although the
paper was devoted to a problem arising in risk management and insurance fields, the game problem
formulation and the numerical methods developed can be more widely used in various other control
and game problems.
For our problem, the nature of the Markov chain approximation relies on building a high
dimensional lattice of both driving state and control strategy to approximate the value functions
under different control scenarios. The optimization on every state follows the same computing
rule, leading to the possibility of using parallel acceleration techniques. The first option coming to
our mind is to incorporate multi-thread programming techniques into our completed C++ MCAM
template library, which enables us to reduce development time by reusing the algorithm architecture
of single-thread library. The latest eighth generation Intel CPUs are equipped with six computation
cores, which allow maximal twelve threads to run simultaneously. If we parallelize the algorithm
using ten threads, we can enhance the time efficiency ten times. However, this is not enough to
handle the computational complexity required for our problem. The high dimensionality requires
the lattice to be very precise, thus obtaining accurate results relies on generating a large number
of nodes. Ten times acceleration seems a big enhancement, but it can only allow us to explore
10
1
7 ≈ 1.39 times of Z, X1, X2, a1, a2, b1, and b2, which is unable to meet requirements of the
computational complexity.
GPU acceleration, e.g., CUDA, is another attractive choice here. Although the frequency of
GPU core is much lower than that of CPU, the number of GPU cores is usually hundreds of times of
the number of CPU cores, and this makes GPU more suitable for parallel computation. The tenth
generation NVidia GPU owns more than two thousand CUDA cores, which make it an easy solution
for solving the complexity issue of MCAM algorithm on common stochastic optimization problem,
where the maximal or the minimal value on a state is acquired from repeatedly comparing the newly
computed value function value against the temporary optimal value so far. However, focusing on
MCAM algorithm on our high dimensional game problem, CUDA acceleration is of very limited
use. Not like CPU memory, which can be easily more than 64GB, the capacity of GPU memory
is usually less than 8GB. The equilibrium strategy is obtained by searching on the value function
information stored for different values of the control strategy. As a result, this memory consumption
will occur for every GPU thread, which will easily lead the aggregated memory consumed by MCAM
algorithm to exceed the GPUs memory capacity. From the above considerations, it appears that
using parallel programming techniques to high dimensional game problems needs a lot of more
thinking and effort. Finding more efficient way for the numerical solution is our on-going work.
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